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Abstract 
 
The Japanese representative philosopher Tetsurō Watsuji’s ethical theory has been influenced 
by Hegel, as many interpreters of Watsuji’s work have pointed out. It is sure that there are many 
resemblances between Watsuji’s ethical theory and that of Hegel. However, the foundational 
concepts of Watsuji’s ethical theory, namely, “aidagara (social relation)” and the dialectic of “kū 
(emptiness),” can be found in his work before his intensive study of Hegel. In this article, I aim 
to elucidate the key differences in terms of the foundational thoughts between Watsuji’s theory 
of “aidagara” and Hegel’s theory of “Sittlichkeit (ethical life).” I will argue that the inter-relation 
of subjects as “aidagara” for Watsuji is a “given” in the sense that it already and always exists, 
and that, in contrast to this, the inter-relation of subjects as “recognition” for Hegel needs to be 
achieved or restored. 
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Introduction 
 
Tetsurō Watsuji (1889–1960) was not only a historian of Japanese culture and thought, but 
also a philosopher who established an original systematic theory of ethics. It has not been difficult 
for interpreters of his ethical theory to find Hegel’s influence in his work.1 According to Koyasu, 
for example, Watsuji acquired the concept of the “dialectic of negation” from Hegel [Koyasu 2010, 
p. 139; Takahashi 2002.]. Both Yuasa and Hoshino point to the influence of Hegel’s theory of 
“Sittlichkeit” in the Philosophy of Right (Philosophie des Rechts) on “jinrinteki soshiki (the 
organization of ethical life),” with which Watsuji’s principal work, Ethics (Rinrigaku), engages in 
detail [Yuasa 1981, p. 267; Hoshino 1993, p. 47]. At first glance, therefore, there appears to be a 
considerable resemblance between the ethical theories of Watsuji and Hegel. However, the two 
theories are not identical. In fact, the origin of both Watsuji’s understanding of a human being as 
“aidagara (social relation)” and the dialectic of “kū (emptiness)” on which his ethical theory is 
based, can be found in his work before he began his intensive study of Hegel.2 
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In this article, I aim to clarify the essential difference between Watsuji’s ethical theory and 
Hegel’s theory of “Sittlichkeit” by understanding the core of Watsuji’s ethical theory as positing 
the theory of “aidagara” and the core of Hegel’s philosophy as positing the philosophy of “spirit.” 
I will restrict this comparative discussion to the foundational level of two theories of community, 
because discussing in detail all the differences between the two theories would far exceed the 
scope of this article. In addition, many interpreters have already pointed out some differences 
between Watsuji’s ethical theory and that of Hegel. However, the differences between the two 
theories of community at the fundamental level, which this article aims to discuss, have to my 
knowledge not yet been examined. This is why I have opted to limit the subject matter of this 
article. The difference between the two theories of community on the fundamental level concerns 
two points of view: the relation between theory and practice, and the foundation of community. I 
think that these two points of view can clarify the essential difference between the two theories 
of community.  
First, I briefly discuss the process through which Watsuji’s ethical theory emerged and his 
study of Hegel. I then clarify Watsuji’s interpretation and criticism of Hegel’s philosophy, which 
is set out in the book Ethics as the Theory of Ningen (Ningen no gaku toshite no rinrigaku). 
Finally, I contrast the difference between Watsuji’s ethical theory and that of Hegel on the 
fundamental level.3  
 
1. The emergence of Watsuji’s ethical theory and his study of Hegel 
 
  Shōzō Shinoda summarizes Watsuji’s thought and its development as follows.  
 
The totality of Watsuji’s thoughts is like a cosmos, and is composed of three elements: his 
study of existentialism, of the history of Japanese culture and thoughts, and of ethics. These 
elements, in this order, express the development of his thought. The central matter of his study, 
which is expressed and is increasingly deepening in that order, is the “ningen.” [Shinoda 1963, 
p. 56]  
 
Informed by this summary, the development of his thought up until his first systematic ethical 
work is briefly examined here. 
  Watsuji began his studies by examining Nietzsche. He published his first book, A Study of 
Nietzsche (1913), after graduating from Tokyo University. Two years later, he published the first 
book on Kierkegaard in Japan. During this period, Watsuji was interested in an existential 
question: How should I live? [Komaki 1986, p. 69] He found an answer in “personalism,” 
according to which the perfection and development of the “person” is most important, within the 
philosophy of Nietzsche and Kierkegaard [Karube 2010, pp. 62ff.]. Through this “personalism” 
and its connections with his view on “culturalism” according to which only “culture” as the 
heritage of humankind can properly form a “person,” Watsuji’s interest turned to the culture of 
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ancient Greece before settling on Japanese culture. His study of Japanese culture and thought 
led to numerous publications.4Watsuji therefore began his career not as a philosopher of ethics, 
but as a historian of Japanese culture and thought. In July 1925, he was invited by two Japanese 
representative philosophers, Seiichi Hatano and Kitarō Nishida, to become an assistant 
professor of ethics at Kyoto University and began to study ethics seriously.5 His first publication 
on ethics was an article entitled “Ethics: Meaning and Method of Ethics as the Theory of Ningen”6, 
after which his book, Ethics as the Theory of Ningen7, was published in 1934. Finally, his main 
work, Ethics, in which his systematic theory of ethics is expounded, was published in three books, 
in 1937, 1942, and 1949. Watsuji studied Hegel intensively at that time in order to establish his 
original systematic theory of ethics. 
  Watsuji appears to have begun to study Hegel’s philosophy from the 1930s, however, he makes 
little mention of Hegel in the article “Ethics” (1931). In this article, he intensively analyzes the 
philosophy of Karl Marx, Aristotle, Kant, and others, where a human being is considered a social 
being which is constituted of “aidagara (social relation).” Against our expectations, Watsuji’s 
references to Hegel are few. However, they are very interesting, because his interpretation of 
Hegel at that time is hinted at.8 He mentions in this article the difference between “Moralität 
(morality)” and “Sittlichkeit (ethical life)” in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right [OAE, p. 80]. Watsuji 
then interprets “Moralität” as “subjective moral conscience,” and “Sittlichkeit” as “objective, 
rational will.” [OAE, p. 80] It is very interesting that he asserts that “rinri” in his own sense is 
more similar [not identical with: T. H.] to “Sittlichkeit” rather than to “Moralität.” Additionally, 
Watsuji already states in his article that the relation between an individual and society is 
dialectical, but he had not yet developed the details of this dialectic relation.  
In contrast to this article, Watsuji devotes much more of the discussion in his book ETN to 
Hegel, indicating that Hegel had become more significant to him.9 Watsuji’s fundamental idea 
in this book is the same as in his article, but there are some differences between these two works. 
First, the structuring of the contents has changed. Second, there are two significant 
developments in Watsuji’s thought occurring in his book, namely, that he identifies Hegel’s 
“Sittlichkeit” with his own ethical theory [ETN, p. 77], and that the relationship between an 
individual and society is considered as the dialectic of “double negation” as in Hegel’s dialectic. 
Additionally, Watsuji labels this dialectical movement as the absolute negativity of the dialectic 
of “kū (emptiness).” [ETN, p. 35]  
While the article “Ethics” and ETN are, so to speak, “the methodological introduction” 
[Koyasu’s explanation in Ethics as the Theory of Ningen (Iwanami bunko, 2007)] to Watsuji’s 
ethical theory, Watsuji first revealed his systematic theory of ethics in his book Ethics. The 
significant development in Ethics is that he provides concrete details of his ethical theory as 
involving the “organization of ethical life (jinrinteki soshiki),” which clearly indicates Hegel’s 
influence. Hegel’s theory of “Sittlichkeit” in Philosophy of Right contains “family,” “civil society,” 
and “state.” Similarly, the “organization of ethical life” contains, according to Watsuji, “family,” 
“relatives,” “society grounded in a region,” “economic organization,” “society grounded in a 
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culture,” and the “state.”  
It is clear that Watsuji’s study of Hegel in the 1930s is likely to have contributed to a more 
systematic approach to ethics, as evidenced in his book Ethics.10 However, the relation between 
Watsuji’s ethical theory as “jinrin” and Hegel’s theory of “Sittlichkeit” is more complex, as the 
translated terms suggest might be the case. Watsuji’s interpretation of Hegel is next examined 
in detail. 
 
2. Watsuji’s interpretation and criticism of Hegel’s philosophy 
 
  In this section, first, I will explore why Watsuji translated Hegel’s term “Sittlichkeit” into the 
Japanese word “jinrin (人倫),” because his translation hints at his understanding of Hegel (Ⅰ). 
In the next step, I will discuss Watsuji’s interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy in his book ETN (Ⅱ).  
  (Ⅰ ) While Watsuji translated the German word “Sittlichkeit” as the Japanese words 
“kyakkanteki riseiteki ishi (objective, rational will)” in his article “Ethics,” he translated it into 
the Japanese word “jinrin” in his book ETN. However, according to Sekiguchi, he provided no 
justification for this choice, although it was not usual at that time to translate Hegel’s term 
“Sittlichkeit” as “jinrin.” [Sekiguchi 2007, p. 217]11 According to Koyasu, Keizō Hayami and 
Ryūhei Okada translated it as “rinri (倫理)” in Hō no tetsugaku (Tettō shoin, 1931), which was 
the first Japanese translation of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right [Koyasu 2010, pp. 41ff.]. Shinichirō 
Nishi, who was a representative Japanese philosopher of ethics at that time, translated it as 
“kyakkanteki dōtoku (objective morality)” in the Dictionary of Philosophy (Tetsugaku jiten) [DP, 
p. 143]. Therefore, we can say that Watsuji had at least four options in order to translate the word 
“Sittlichkeit” into Japanese. 
  As Watsuji argued in his book ETN [ETN, 12], if the word “rinri (倫理)” involved an 
understanding of a human being as a social being (an entity that consists of social relations as 
“aidagara”), he could have used “rinri” in order to translate Hegel’s term “Sittlichkeit,” but he did 
not do so. Instead he used the word “jinrin (人倫).” One reason why Watsuji used the word “jinrin” 
is that in Japan at that time, the term “rinri (倫理)” had been used as a translation of the English 
word “ethics,” which was understood as the science of the subjective moral conscience of the 
individual [Koyasu 2010, pp. 41ff.]. However this situation does not fully explain why Watsuji 
chose the word “jinrin,” as he could have chosen another option such as “kyakkanteki dōtoku,” 
as used by Nishi. Therefore, it seems that there must have been another reason, and this can be 
found in Watsuji’s interpretation of Hegel’s theory of “Sittlichkeit,” namely, that Watsuji 
identified Hegel’s theory of “Sittlichkeit” with his own ethical theory [ETN, p. 77].  
As we have already seen, Watsuji published his article “Ethics” before his intensive study of 
Hegel and discussed the foundations of his own ethical theory in which ethics is considered as 
“jinrin” which is identical to “aidagara.” [OAE, pp. 80f.] This suggests that the reason why he 
translated Hegel’s term “Sittlichkeit” as “jinrin” is that he found himself in Hegel’s ethical theory. 
It is likely that after Watsuji first gained his understanding of human beings as social beings 
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through his study of Marx, he decided to use the Confucian term “jinrin,” which means social and 
ethical relations between human beings, in order to demonstrate that the understanding of 
human beings as social beings is also traditional for Japanese people.12 He then used the term 
“jinrin” for Hegel’s “Sittlichkeit” in the next step of his development.13  Watsuji, therefore, 
interpreted Hegel’s theory from the standpoint of his own ethical theory. How then did he 
interpret Hegel? 
  (Ⅱ) Watsuji interprets the development of Hegel’s philosophy as the development from ethics, 
i.e., from the philosophy of “jinrin,” to the “philosophy of spirit.” This “ethics” must then be 
understood in Watsuji’s own sense [ETN, p. 77]. In other words, he reads Hegel’s ethical theory 
as a theory of “jinrin” in his sense. Furthermore, according to Watsuji, it is within the System der 
Sittlichkeit that Hegel’s ethical theory as an analysis of the nature of a human being is most 
clearly set out in its purest form. Interestingly, Watsuji highlighted that Hegel’s theory in System 
der Sittlichkeit had not yet become the “philosophy of spirit.” According to Watsuji, this 
transformation from the “philosophy of jinrin” to the “philosophy of spirit” occurred in 
Phenomenology of Spirit. In addition, he interprets this transformation as necessary, as he finds 
the core of Hegel’s philosophy of spirit in “ethics,” and that “ethics” must, according to him, 
develop essentially into the “philosophy of spirit.” [ETN, pp. 75f.] We can see here that Watsuji 
finds an essential relation between the concept of “Sittlichkeit” and the concept of “spirit” in 
Hegel’s philosophy. He interprets this transformation as follows. “In System der Sittlichkeit the 
absolute realizes itself practically as the organization of ethical life (jinrinteki soshiki).” [ETN, p. 
98] However, Hegel’s “philosophy of jinrin” focusses on the cognition of the absolute jinrin 
(Sittlichkeit), and for this reason, it becomes the self-cognition of the absolute, for Hegel identified 
the absolute jinrin with “nation (Volk)” in System der Sittlichkeit, but “nation” is not the true 
absolute because of its form and its individuality. Thus, in Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel 
identified the absolute with the self-cognition of the absolute spirit (the absolute knowledge as 
the self-knowledge of the spirit). Watsuji argues that “through this problem of cognition, ‘spirit’ 
has primacy over jinrin,” and “we can see clearly Hegel’s new standpoint in his concept of ‘spirit’.” 
[ETN, p. 98] Therefore, in Phenomenology of Spirit, the realization of “jinrin” is reduced to a stage 
in the self-cognition process of the absolute [ETN, pp. 98f.]. 
  Here, we could ask whether Watsuji’s interpretation of Hegel is correct.14 This is surely an 
important problem. However, it is more important and more interesting for us to ask how Watsuji 
interpreted Hegel’s work rather than whether his interpretation is correct, for it implicates the 
essential difference between the standpoints of Watsuji and Hegel. We will now examine 
Watsuji’s interpretation of Hegel. His interpretation consists of three points.  
 
(a) Identity-thesis of spirit and Sittlichkeit (jinrin): Spirit (the absolute) realizes itself 
practically as the organization of ethical life, i.e., “nation” in the System der Sittlichkeit.  
 
(b) Transformation-thesis: However, the nation is not the true absolute because of its form 
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and individuality. Thus, Hegel had to transform his thought from “nation” as the absolute 
to the self-cognition of spirit as the absolute. 
 
(c) Primacy-thesis of sprit over Sittlichkeit (jinrin): We can see Hegel’s new standpoint 
according to which the absolute is the self-cognition of spirit in Phenomenology of Spirit. 
Now, spirit has primacy over Sittlichkeit. 
 
  Interestingly, Watsuji’s interpretation of the development of Hegel’s philosophy is similar to 
Habermas’ [Habermas 1969] or Honneth’s interpretations [Honneth 1992] at first glance. In 
addition, it is also interesting for us that Watsuji pointed out Hegel’s “paradigm-shift” of his 
standpoint from a philosopher of practice to a philosopher of theoretical cognition15 long before 
the two European philosophers of the Frankfurter School did so after the 1960s. However, to 
what extent is Watsuji’s interpretation of Hegel correct? Point (a) is correct. It is certain that 
Hegel considered in the System der Sittlichkeit that the absolute (spirit) realizes itself in the 
“nation.” [Kōyama 1936, pp. 80f.; Kaneko 1989, p. 175; Siep 2014 (1979), p. 188] Point (c) is also 
correct. According to Hisatake Katō, Hegel turned to “intellectualism” during his time in Jena 
[Katō 1980, 97ff.]. However, point (b) is partly false. We are sure that the transformation occurred 
in Hegel’s philosophy during his time in Jena. However, the reason why it occurred, for which 
Watsuji accounts, is not correct. He discusses it as follows. Hegel identified the “absolute jinrin” 
or the “ethical totality” with the “nation” in System der Sittlichkeit. However, the “nation” is not 
the true absolute because of its form and individuality. Therefore, the alternate, which Hegel 
could choose as the true absolute, was only the self-cognition of the absolute spirit. However, the 
reason why Hegel had to change his philosophical project during his time in Jena was because 
he had to relinquish his ideal of the beautiful harmony of religion, philosophy, and the state, 
which he found in the ancient Greek polis [Katō 1980, p. 211]. That means that Hegel found the 
historical nature of spirit; his philosophy of history, whose object was the historical development 
of spirit, was born [Katō 1980, p. 211].  
  However, we can find the difference between Watsuji’s standpoint and Hegel’s by considering 
the way that Watsuji interpreted Hegel’s work. Therefore, his interpretation is more interesting 
to us, even if it is false in part. After all, Watsuji’s criticism of Hegel is that Hegel grounded “jinrin,” 
that is, his ethical theory on “spirit.” The true absolute on which “jinrin” can be grounded is, 
according to Watsuji, not “spirit” but “kū (emptiness),” which is the fundamental concept of 
Buddhism.16 According to Watsuji, 
 
However, the absolute spirit can be the ultimate principle of the self-cognition of spirit, but 
not the ultimate ground of the ethical (jinrinteki) reality which contains also the irrational. 
[ETN, p. 108] 
 
The indifference in which the difference is contained, which Hegel emphasizes, is both the 
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structure of all organizations of ethical life and “kū” as its absoluteness. [ETN, p. 108] 
 
Here is the essential difference between the Frankfurter School’s criticism of Hegel and 
Watsuji’s criticism. Both the philosophers of the Frankfurter School and Watsuji criticized Hegel 
in that the inter-subjectivity melted down into the mono-logical subjectivity of the absolute spirit 
in Phenomenology of Spirit. However, this agreement between the European philosophers and 
the Japanese philosopher is merely superficial. Habermas and Honneth criticized the change of 
the concept of spirit in Hegel’s philosophy. That is, they criticized the change from the inter-
subjective concept of spirit to the mono-logical concept of spirit. However, they did not criticize 
the fact that the community was grounded in spirit. The foundational problem for them was 
what kind of spirit grounds the community of human beings. Against this, what Watsuji 
criticized in the first place was that the community is grounded in spirit, whatever it may be. In 
System der Sittlichkeit, this fundamental falsehood was only concealed by Hegel’s identifying 
“spirit” with “nation,” although from the beginning, the absolute was “spirit” for Hegel. However, 
for Watsuji, the true absolute in which the community as the ethical totality can be grounded is 
nothing but “kū” as the “absolute negativity.”17 
 
3. Watsuji’s concept of “aidagara” 
 
  By examining Watsuji’s interpretation and criticism of Hegel’s philosophy, we have confirmed 
that there was a foundational difference between Watsuji’s standpoint on his ethical theory and 
Hegel’s standpoint on his theory of “Sittlichkeit,” although Watsuji identified Hegel’s theory of 
“Sittlichkeit” with his own ethical theory. Due to this difference, it is to be expected that Watsuji’s 
ethical theory would differ from Hegel’s theory of “Sittlichkeit.” This essential difference can be 
clearly understood by examining the concept of “aidagara,” which is at the core of Watsuji’s ethical 
theory, and the concept of “spirit,” which is at the core of Hegel’s theory of “Sittlichkeit.” In the 
following, as I have already mentioned in the introduction, I will clarify the foundational 
differences between these two ethical theories of community from two points of view: the relation 
between theory and practice on the one hand, and the foundation of community on the other. 
I begin with the article “Ethics,” which is considered to be the original text of Watsuji’s ethical 
theory, to explain his concept of “aidagara.” Following the publication of the article “Ethics,” the 
concept of “aidagara” does not change in Watsuji’s thought; this article offers an opportunity to 
engage with the concept in its clearest formulation, as it served as the foundation of Watsuji’s 
ethical theory. 
  Watsuji’s ethical theory is the theory of “ningen,” since the main subject matter of ethics must 
be “ningen.” This is the heart of Watsuji’s ethical theory. However, this statement in and of itself 
does not explain anything. A further question needs to be posed, namely, what is “ningen”? 
“Ningen” generally refers to a human being or human beings (a Japanese noun usually contains 
both the singular and plural forms). Some sciences already deal with human beings and therefore 
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the question correctly posed should be, what is a human being as the subject matter of ethics? 
According to Watsuji, this is the foundational question of ethics. A human being as a natural 
entity is not under consideration here, since that is the concern of biology, physiology, or 
bioscience, not ethics. A human being is, in terms of the subject matter of ethics, a social being. 
Watsuji derived this insight that a human being is, in essence, a social being, from his study of 
Marx. Watsuji considers the “material” in Marx’s materialism as the social relation of human 
beings, and he calls this social relation of human beings “aidagara.” Therefore, “ningen” is 
nothing but “aidagara” in so far as “ningen” consists of “aidagara.” According to Watsuji, it is a 
human being, understood as “aidagara,” that is the subject matter of ethics. However, what in 
specific terms is “aidagara”? Watsuji analyzes the structure of the foundational question of ethics 
after stating that the subject matter of ethics involves “ningen” as “aidagara.” According to 
Watsuji, “[t]he entity which asks what is ningen is itself ningen which is the very object of this 
question. In addition to this, the question itself, as a question which ningen asks, means an 
airagara.” [OAE, p. 109] Therefore, we can elucidate what “aidagara” is through an analysis of 
the structure of this question. In the question, “What is ningen?” which consists of “aidagara,” 
the following two things are realized. The first is the identity of the subject and object. The second 
is that the identity of the subject and object means, in the case of the theory of “ningen,” 
“aidagara,” i.e., an inter-subjective relation [OAE, p. 109]. 
  According to Watsuji, “aidagara” is not identical to the relation between subject and object. In 
addition, the relation that is considered as the opposition between subject and object is in fact 
“the opposition between outer nature and inner mind,” and this opposition emerges only “in the 
‘theoretical subject’.” [OAE, p. 110] This is the framework of modern epistemology, in which the 
mind theoretically engages with the outer world. This is also the standpoint of theoretical 
sciences that consider human beings as natural entities, for example, physics. Watsuji believes, 
on the contrary, that a standpoint that considers the relation between subject and object to be 
only oppositional not only forgets that this type of understanding does not consider the social 
relationships between human beings and their own bodies, but also cannot be used to accurately 
understand the genuine structure of consciousness (subjectivity) itself. According to Watsuji, 
consciousness is essentially intentional (relational), and there is no subject or object without this 
relation, “This relation is primary over ‘I’ or ‘things.’ The relation has primacy.” [OAE, p. 111] 
Therefore, subject and object are originally united in the intentional relation. Watsuji simply 
calls this intentional relation “intentionality” 18  or “the transcendental personality.” The 
oppositional relation between subject and object is only derived from the transcendental 
personality, which is the original unit of subject and object. According to Watsuji, genuine 
subjectivity occurs in this intentionality.19  
However, Watsuji claims that the intentionality is not yet identical with “aidagara.” The 
intentionality is a one-sided relation, whereas “aidagara” is an inter-relational relation. Therefore, 
“aidagara” means the “inter-relation or community of subjects.” [OAE, p. 109] “We” is “the 
standpoint from which all human beings as subjects are related,” “therefore aidagara contains 
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the understanding of this inter-subjectivity of all human beings.” [ETN, p. 139] This standpoint 
of “we” has primacy over “the opposition of subject and object,” and “‘we’ is found originally before 
‘I’ am found.” [ETN, 75] “For I find myself though I find you or others, and we can find ourselves 
and others only because of aidagara.” [ETN, pp. 75f.] Therefore, that “ningen” is “aidagara,” that 
is, a social being, means that a human being is essentially conditioned by “the relation of actions” 
which is called “we.” Watsuji’s comments on the relation between “I” and “we,” or “aidagara,” 
appear to resemble Hegel’s concept of “spirit,” which at first glance is argued in the theory of “self-
consciousness” in Phenomenology of Spirit. I will argue this point. 
“Accordingly, the theory of ningen, although it is a theory, must be fundamentally 
distinguished from all other theories in which object is observed by cognitive subject.” [OAE, p. 
116] That is, ethics as the theory of “ningen” is a practical science, but not a theoretical science. 
Watsuji justifies this difference between practical science and theoretical science by referencing 
the Kantian difference between theoretical and practical reason [OAE, 116]. The use of 
theoretical reason is “cognition,” which means that the subject theoretically observes objects, 
while, in the case of the use of practical reason, the matter is the practical subject [OAE, p. 116]. 
Consequently, according to Watsuji, “[t]he theory of ningen as the theory of practical subject is 
distinguished from all other theories of theoretical object in this sense.” [OAE, p. 118] 
  As we have seen above, “aidagara” is the inter-relation of practicing subjects, which is called 
“we.” However, there is no argument in Watsuji’s ethical theory that argues how the standpoint 
of “we,” i.e., the inter-relation of subjects as community, is possible in the first place. This omission 
anticipates that there was no need for Watsuji to discuss it. That is, he regarded “aidagara,” i.e., 
community as a “given,” in Sellars’ sense.20 For Watsuji, “aidagara” is just found, but not founded. 
It always and already exists everywhere. “Aidagara” therefore not only means community itself, 
but also the foundation of community. I think that this is why “he fails to consider the problem of 
relation between individuals, and only treats the problem of the relation between an individual 
and totality (society) in one step.” [Utsunomiya 1970, p. 141]  
 
4. Hegel’s concept of spirit 
 
I turn now to Hegel’s concept of “spirit” insofar as it is related to this discussion. Hegel’s theory 
of “Sittlichkeit” is very closely connected to his concept of “spirit,” as Watsuji correctly pointed out. 
Watsuji’s concept of “aidagara” as the inter-relation of practicing subjects corresponds to Hegel’s 
concept of “spirit,” which raises the question as to what “spirit” is in Hegel’s philosophy. The 
answer can be found in an analysis of the development of Hegel’s practical philosophy and the 
concept of spirit which Hegel puts forth in his theory of “self-consciousness” in Phenomenology of 
Spirit.21 First, I will briefly explain the development of Hegel’s practical philosophy during his 
time in Jena, and second, examine the concept of spirit that is discussed in the theory of “self-
consciousness” in Phenomenology of Spirit. 
Hegel had discussed his practical philosophy, i.e., the theory of “Sittlichkeit,” in connection with 
74  
 
the concept of spirit since System der Sittlichkeit which Watsuji evaluated as a model of ethical 
theory in his own sense.22 However, the structure of System der Sittlichkeit still relied on the 
framework of Aristotelian politics. This teaches us that Hegel could not yet accept modern 
individualism. Hegel only opposed the beautiful harmony of individuals in their nation, which is 
found in the ancient Greek polis and called the “absolute Sittlichkeit,” to modern individualism 
whose representative philosophers are Hobbes, Locke, Kant, and Fichte in “On the Scientific 
Ways of Treating Natural Law.” However, through his engagement of “reflection philosophy,” 
which Hegel called Jacobi, Kant, and Fichte’s philosophy, he had connected his concept of spirit 
with the theory of consciousness, i.e., the concept of “reflection,” since the “manuscript of the 
philosophy of spirit in 1803/04.” In addition, Hegel linked the theory of natural state, which is 
argued in the modern theory of natural law, especially in Hobbes’ version of it, i.e., the struggle 
of all human beings in the natural state, with the concept of “recognition (Anerkennung),” which 
Hegel learned from Fichte. Through these two improvements, Hegel could construct a new 
version of the theory of “Sittlichkeit” as his practical philosophy, whose character consists of the 
following two points: the integrity of the modern theory of individual autonomy, that is, modern 
individualism within Aristotelian politics on the one hand, and the theory of the cultivation 
(Bildung) of consciousness, i.e., the theory of the necessary development from individual to 
universal consciousness, on the other. Consequently, Hegel accepted modern individualism; in 
other words, he saw the loss of the beautiful harmony of individuals in the ancient Greek polis 
as a necessary medium in his theory of “Sittlichkeit.” His theory appealed to the restoration of 
the beautiful harmony of individuals in their nation, which he reasoned man could only find in 
the ancient Greek polis, under conditions of his time. This indicates that Hegel’s concept of spirit 
is now historicized, in that it consists of the dialectical process from the immediate unity through 
its division to the reflected (mediated) unity. That is, the genuine unity of spirit must be mediated 
by its division; therefore, is not immediate unity, but reflected (mediated) unity. This restoration 
process of the unity of spirit is positioned on the cultivating process of consciousness, i.e., the 
developmental process from individual to universal consciousness. Consequently, Hegel’s 
practical philosophy in 1805/06 was organized in terms of the practical part that mostly 
corresponded to the “objective spirit” in Encyclopedia as follows: from the immediate unity of 
family which was named the “natural ethical life (natürliche Sittlichkeit)” in System der 
Sittlichkeit, through the struggle of recognition in the natural state as a division of the immediate 
unity of the family, to civil society as a market that is ruled by law, and finally to the political 
state (nation) as the mediated (reflected) unity that was named the “absolute ethical life (absolute 
Sittlichkeit)” in System der Sittlichkeit. The struggle for recognition functions then as a 
necessary medium to the (reflected) unity of spirit in the nation, which refers to the realization 
of recognition; in other words, as the necessary moment of the development from individual to 
universal consciousness. 
  It is clear that this concept of spirit in the “manuscript of the philosophy of spirit in 1805/06” is 
closely linked with the concept of spirit in Phenomenology of Spirit in which Hegel developed his 
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original philosophy which regards the truth or the absolute as the subject, i.e. “spirit” is clearly 
manifested. In what follows, relying on the argument put forth above, I will examine Hegel’s 
concept of spirit that is discussed in “B. self-consciousness” in Phenomenology of Spirit. 
According to Hegel, consciousness in the narrow sense (Bewußtsein) is consciousness of an 
object, which considers an object as an independent entity (Ansichsein). Therefore, this 
consciousness is theoretically related to its object in the framework of the opposition between 
subject and object. In contrast, self-consciousness (Selbstbewußtsein) is the consciousness that 
considers not an object but itself as an independent entity. That is, Being on itself (Ansichsein) 
and Being for itself (Fürsichsein) is identical in self-consciousness. The chapter “A. consciousness” 
in Phenomenology of Spirit details the necessary process from consciousness to self-
consciousness, and chapter “B. self-consciousness” details the necessary process from a belief in 
self-consciousness to its truth. There are two purposes in the chapter “B. self-consciousness,” 
which are to set out the conditions of self-consciousness as such and to argue that self-
consciousness is essentially “spirit.” The important points of Hegel’s argument are as follows: 
(Ⅰ) The unity of theory and practice in self-consciousness. Self-consciousness in Hegel’s 
philosophy is the consciousness for which its object is not only its other, but also itself. It is 
immediately sure that its other is itself. In other words, self-consciousness has only certainty of 
the self. This form of self-consciousness is simply the immediate unity of (self-) consciousness and 
its other. Thus, its certainty does not yet become the truth. Therefore, self-consciousness aims to 
gain self-knowledge as the truth, the true knowledge that its object is in truth identical with itself, 
through the negation of the appearance of its object as its other. For that purpose, 
(self-)consciousness practically has something to do with its object. The relation between 
consciousness in the narrow sense and self-consciousness is that the true form of the 
consciousness of the object is consciousness of itself, that is, self-consciousness. Accordingly, the 
consciousness of the object is implied (aufgehoben) in self-consciousness in the sense that 
consciousness of the object is a constitutional element of self-consciousness; therefore, the 
theoretical relation of consciousness in the narrow sense is not only distinguished from the 
practical relation of self-consciousness, but also implied as a necessary element of this practical 
relation.23  
(Ⅱ) Regaining of the body in self-consciousness. According to Hegel, self-consciousness is the 
consciousness that has a certain belief in the self, and its first form is “desire.” The object of self-
consciousness as “desire” is “life.” This formulation of self-consciousness as “desire” indicates that 
the existence of the body is implied in self-consciousness. “Desire” always needs its object that 
must be negated by it, for self-consciousness has the certainty of itself in the self only through 
the negation of “life” as its other. This demonstrates, Hegel claims, that self-consciousness as 
“desire” is not self-consciousness in the true sense, for it cannot overcome the objectivity of the 
object.  
(Ⅲ) “Recognition” as a constitutional condition of self-consciousness. That “desire” cannot be 
sure that it is an independent entity reveals that “[s]elf-consciousness exists in and for itself when, 
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and by the fact that it so exists for another; that is it exists only in being acknowledged.” [PS, p. 
111] According to Hegel, self-consciousness needs other self-consciousness to exist as it is. Hegel 
calls this relation between self-consciousness and other self-consciousness “recognition 
(Anerkennung),” but this relation is not given for self-consciousness in the first place. That is, 
self-consciousness must establish this relation through the “movement of recognition.” 
“Recognition” is the inter-relation of self-consciousness and other self-consciousness, in which the 
negation of the self (the affirmation of the other) turns into the affirmation of the self (the 
negation of the other), and in turn the affirmation of the self (the negation of the other) turns into 
the negation of the self (the affirmation of the other). At the same time, the negation of the self 
refers to a cultivation (Bildung) of the self from a singularity (the individual self-consciousness) 
to a universality (the universal self-consciousness), which is the historical aspect of self-
consciousness. Then, the movement of “recognition” is a necessary medium in the cultivation 
process of self-consciousness from its singularity to its universality (spirit as universal self-
consciousness).24 Hegel considers the unity of individuality and universality as true freedom and 
this unity is called “spirit.”  
(Ⅳ) Self-consciousness as a concept of spirit. The unity of self-consciousness and other self-
consciousness, through the movement of recognition, is called “spirit.” Hegel formulates the 
“spirit” as follows: “‘I’ that is ‘We’ and ‘We’ that is ‘I’.” [PS, p. 110] According to Hegel, self-
consciousness in “spirit” is independent from its others, even though it is simultaneously related 
to its others. Consequently, spirit as the inter-relation of self-consciousnesses is not immediate 
unity, but the mediated (reflected) unity of self-consciousnesses. This mediated (reflected) unity 
of spirit that is brought through the movement of recognition, which is therefore different from 
the immediate unity of spirit in the ancient Greek polis, is the true unity of spirit for Hegel. We 
can find the same process of spirit (immediate unity, its division, and mediated unity as the 
recovery of unity) in Hegel’s theory of self-consciousness in Phenomenology of Spirit as in his 
philosophy of spirit in 1805/06, although they have different points of view and aims. This process 
of spirit is nothing but the historical character of spirit.  
According to Siep, Hegel’s practical philosophy in his Jena period was grounded in the principle 
of “recognition.” [Siep 2014 (1979)] Hegel’s theory of “Sittlichkeit” from that time involved the 
social institutions required for “recognition,” in other words, the concrete forms of “recognition.” 
In the later Encyclopedia, the concept of “Sittlichkeit” belongs to the “objective spirit” which is 
grounded in the concept of “free will,” but the concept of “recognition” still functions. 
 
Conclusion  
 
There are many resemblances between Watsuji’s theory of “aidagara” and Hegel’s theory of 
“spirit.” It is noteworthy that both philosophers thought that inter-subjectivity has primacy over 
the relation of subject and object. However, while depending on the Kantian difference between 
practical and theoretical reason, Watsuji only distinguishes the practical science from the 
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theoretical science; however, the theoretical relation is also implied in the practical relation in 
Hegel’s philosophy. That is, the standpoints of these two philosophers in terms of the relation 
between theory and practice are different. In addition, there is a more fundamental difference 
between Watsuji and Hegel concerning inter-subjectivity (community). I think that for Watsuji, 
“aidagara” is a given in the philosophical sense as understood and used by Sellars; therefore, that 
“aidagara” must be found, premised on the assumption that “aidagara” is the inter-relation of 
subjects, is always and already present to us. In contrast, for Hegel, the inter-relation of subjects 
as “spirit” must be established (or properly restored) through the movement of recognition. The 
true unity of spirit is the mediated (reflected) unity for Hegel, that is, restored but not in the sense 
that the very same unity is brought about. A community that is grounded in the mutual 
recognition of subjects is achieved only through the struggle for recognition, even if self-
consciousness is essentially a social being, i.e., the “spirit.” In this light, I consider that a key 
question for Hegel concerning how community or relationships can be restored, is radically 
absent from Watsuji’s work. Hegel worried about how we could restore the standpoint of “we” 
under the conditions of his time, i.e., the unity of the nation which was, according to Hegel, 
realized in the ancient polis. However, Watsuji does not ask how the standpoint of “we,” the inter-
relation of subjects, can be established, and on this point, his ethical theory is in essence 
ahistorical. Watsuji’s theory of “aidagara” can be seen as abstracting away from the historical 
aspects of Hegel’s theory of “Sittlichkeit.” 
Finally, I would like to briefly mention some interpretative issues not discussed in this article. 
The absence of a historical viewpoint in Watsuji’s theory provides the key means to address the 
issues raised. One issue concerns the different understandings of the dialectic of Watsuji and 
Hegel. Another issue concerns differences in what is needed between Watsuji’s theory of “jinrin” 
and Hegel’s theory of “Sittlichkeit” from the viewpoint of cultivation (Bildung). It is necessary to 
address these issues through a deeper understanding of Watsuji’s personalism that grounds his 
early views on cultivation and how his personalism transformed into his theory of “aidagara.” 
This would allow for a more informed insight into how Watsuji understood the historical aspects 
of “jinrin.” Such proposed future studies would elucidate the link between Watsuji as a historian 
and as a philosopher of ethics. 
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Notes 
 
1 According to Kaneko, Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel were especially important philosophers for 
Watsuji [Kaneko 1961, p. 177]. 
2 According to Miyagawa [2015, pp. 239ff.], Watsuji’s analysis of the dialectical unity or relation 
of “individuality and totality” had already been expressed in his lecture “Japanese Language 
and Philosophy (Nihongo to tetsugaku)” in 1928. The origin of his interpretation of 
Buddhism, on which his dialectic of “kū (emptiness)” is based, can be seen in the Practical 
Philosophy of Primitive Buddhism (Genshi bukkyō no jissen tetsugaku, 1927).  
Here, I mention the English translation of this article. Watsuji’s term “人間(ningen)” 
contains two meanings which are, according to Watsuji, essentially related, i.e., 
simultaneously an individual human being and the world of human beings (society). 
However, there is no English word that fully corresponds to the term “ningen,” as Watsuji 
has pointed out. Robert E. Carter who translated Watsuji’s Ethics (Rinrigaku) into English 
says the following: “The Japanese word ningen is usually translated as “human being,” 
“person,” or “man.” But it also means the betweenness [aidagara: T. H.] of human beings. 
The customary English translation does not carry both sense of ningen.” [Watsuji Tetsurō’s 
Rinrigaku, translated by Yamamoto Seisaku and Robert E. Carter, Albany: State University 
of New York Press, 1996, p. 356] Consequently, I have chosen to use the word “ningen” in 
this article, following Yamamoto and Carter in Watsuji Tetsurō’s Rinrigaku. In addition, I 
have translated Watsuji’s term “aidagara” into the phrase “social relation.” Hegel’s term 
“Sittlichkeit” is translated in this article as “ethical life.” Here I have chosen to follow the 
practices of many English-speaking philosophers. 
3 Here, I show the comparative correspondence between Watsuji and Hegel’s key concepts. See 
the following table. In this article, I will primarily discuss the differences concerning the 
principle of community. The reason why I have chosen to do so has already been noted. 
 
 Foundation of community Institutional community The absolute 
Watsuji aidagara (ningen) jinrinteki soshiki kū  
Hegel spirit (self-consciousness) ethical life Ideal or absolute spirit 
 
4 For example, The Recovery of Idols (Gūzō saikō, 1918), Pilgrimages to the Ancient Temples in 
Nara (Koji junrei, 1919: This English title is translated by Hiroshi Nara), Primitive Culture 
in Japan (Nihon kodai bunka, 1920), and A Historical Study of Japanese Thought (Nihon 
seishinshi kenkyū, 1926). 
5 Seiichi Hatano (1877–1950) was a Japanese philosopher of religion. Kitarō Nishida (1870–
1945) was Japan’s most famous philosopher whose representative work is An Inquiry into 
the Good (1911). Nishida was also the central figure of the Kyoto School. 
6 I refer to The Tetsurō Watsuji’s original article “Ethics” which was edited by Tadashi Karube 
in 2017 (Chikuma gakugei bunko) when I quote from his article “Ethics.” From here on, I 
use the abbreviation OAE. 
7 I refer to The Works of Tetsurō Watsuji, No. 9 (Iwanami, 1962) when I quote from his 
book Ethics as the Theory of Ningen. From here on, I use the abbreviation ETN. 
8 In this article, he only mentions Hegel five times. 
9 Hegel’s philosophy features more prominently in ETN, where, in particular, Watsuji analyzes 
Hegel’s thinking concerning the System of Ethical Life (This title is translated by Knox), “On 
the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Law” (This title is translated by Knox), the 
Phenomenology of Spirit (This title is translated by Miller), and the Elements of the 
Philosophy of Right (This title is translated by Nisbet). 
10 In fact, Iwao Kōyama (1905–1993), who was a Japanese philosopher of the Kyoto School and 
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published the book Hegel in 1936 (Kōbundō), lectured on Hegel’s Philosophy of Right at 
Kyoto University at Watsuji’ request. Watsuji led a seminar at Tokyo University from 1935 
on Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, which indicates Watsuji’s deepening appreciation of Hegel’s 
work. 
11 According to Sekiguchi, Tadayoshi Kihira appears to have been the first to translate 
“Sittlichkeit” as “jinrin.” [Sekiguchi 2007, p. 237] 
12  Confucianism is a set of a religious elements and teachings that were established by 
Confucius (551–479 BC) in China. Confucianism came to Japan from China in the sixth 
century. At the time, the Japanese people did not accept any religious elements of 
Confucianism, but only the teaching of it. 
13 Therefore, in my forthcoming article, I highlight the change in the way in which the concept 
of “jinrin” is used between Watsuji and traditional Japanese Confucianism. The article is 
titled “Welche Anregungen erhielt Watsuji von Hegel?” and will soon be published by 
Mentis. 
14 However, we must consider Watsuji’s restrictions in terms of the texts that he could use in 
order to interpret Hegel’s philosophy when we evaluate his interpretation of Hegel, for 
Hegel’s works that were edited by the Westfalen Academy were not yet published in his 
time. 
15 Heinz Paetzold says as the following: “Watsujis These ist, dass Hegel selbst eine 
Paradigmenwechsel vollzieht. Vom praktischen Philosophen geht er über zum 
Erkenntnistheoretiker. Wenigstens is das so in der Phänomenologie (Watsuji’s thesis is that 
Hegel carried out a paradigm-shift. He changes from a philosopher of practice to a 
philosopher of theoretical cognition. At the latest, it is so in the Phenomenology).” [Paetzold 
2008, p. 176] 
16 The Buddhist concept of “kū (emptiness)” which Watsuji uses here is from the Middle School 
of Buddhism whose central figure is Nāgārjuna (150–250). The concept of “kū” means that 
nothing supports itself, for everything depends on one another. 
17 According to Watsuji, the totality of a human being, which is the dialectic unity of 
individuality and totality, is grounded on “kū” as the absolute negativity. “The first point to 
be argued is that of the double structure of a human being. … A detailed grasp of this double 
structure will reveal that it is precisely a movement of negation. On the one hand, the 
standpoint of an acting ‘individual’ comes to be established only in some way as a negation of 
totality of ningen. … On the other hand, totality of ningen comes to be established as the 
negation of individuality. … These two negations constitute a single movement. … Now, that 
ningen’s sonzai is, fundamentally speaking, a movement of negation makes it clear that the 
basis of ningen’s sonzai is negation as such, that is, absolute negation. The true reality of an 
individual, as well as of totality, is ‘emptiness’, and this emptiness is the absolute totality.” 
[Watsuji Tetsurō’s Rinrigaku, translated by Yamamoto Seisaku and Robert E. Carter, 
Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996, pp. 22f.] A movement of negation on 
which the totality of a human being is grounded is, according to Watsuji, the dialectic of “kū.” 
Watsuji’s dialectic on which his ethical theory is grounded, is the dialectic of “kū,” while we 
can call Hegel’s dialectic the speculative dialectic or the dialectic of the “Ideal.” I mention 
here briefly the difference between these two dialectics, because we must examine Watsuji’s 
interpretation of Buddhism in order to discuss in detail the difference between the two 
dialectics. Hegel’s “dialectic” has two meanings, that is, dialectic in the narrow sense and 
dialectic in the broad sense. Hegel’s dialectic in the narrow sense is the negative-rational 
moment of the Logical. This moment corresponds to the essence of skepticism in the history 
of philosophy. In skepticism, a negation of something does not have a positive result. 
However, Hegel’s dialectic in a broad sense has not only a skeptical (negative-rational) 
aspect, but also a positive-rational aspect, which is called the “speculative” aspect. The 
speculative dialectic is positive, for it “synthesizes” the opposition. Therefore, it has a positive 
result. Thus, for Hegel, the absolute is the “Ideal,” which is a unity of being and thought. 
Watsuji’s dialectic, which corresponds only to the negative-rational aspect of Hegel’s 
dialectic, i.e., Hegel’s dialectic in the narrow sense, does not have this “speculative” aspect 
(Interestingly, Hisatake Katō [1992] discusses the influence of the concept of “kū” in 
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Buddhism through ancient skepticism from Pyrrhōn to Hegel). For Watsuji, the absolute is 
“emptiness.” This is the difference between Watsuji and Hegel’s dialectic. 
18 Watsuji’s argument in this part is essentially influenced by Heidegger [ETN, p. 137]. 
19 Therefore, Watsuji distinguishes the transcendental personality from the 
“psychological ego,” which is opposed to the object [OAE. p. 114]. 
20 Sellars criticized the concept of the “given” especially in cognitive theory. However, according 
to him, the concept of the “given” is used not only in cognitive theory, but also in many 
disciplines. “Many things have been said to be ‘given’: sense contents, material objects, 
universal, propositions, real connections, first principles, even givenness itself.” [Sellars 
1997, p. 14] 
21 I refer to the Phenomenology of Spirit (translated by A. V. Miller, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1977), when I quote from Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. From here on, I use the 
abbreviation PS. Hegel argues in the theory of self-consciousness in Phenomenology of Spirit 
as follows: “The detailed exposition of the Notion of this spiritual unity in its duplication will 
present us with the process of Recognition.” [PS, p. 111] This means that we can elucidate 
what is spirit in Hegel’s philosophy by analyzing Hegel’s theory of self-consciousness and 
recognition. 
22 The following discussion in this article refers mainly to Siep 2014 (1979). 
23 According to Halbig et. al 2004, Hegel’s social concept of self-consciousness is a “central knot 
between the practical aspect and the theoretical aspect in Hegel’s philosophy.” [Halbig et. al., 
2004, 12] Klaus Vieweg pointed out the “free spirit as unity of the theoretical spirit and the 
practical spirit.” [Vieweg 2012, p. 50: This sentence was translated by T. H.] 
24 Hegel’s Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences clearly argues this point. 
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